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Act would require a systematic review of these statutes and the
development of new federal guidelines to guide nationwide HIVcriminalization reform. This Note investigates the federal government’s
previous attempts at setting national guidelines for HIV criminalization and
offers recommendations for improvements that could be made under the
REPEAL Act. In particular, I argue that HIV-specific statues should be
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Nick Rhoades, an HIV-positive man living in Iowa, received
a twenty-five-year prison sentence and was forced to register as a sex
offender after having a one-time consensual sexual encounter with another
man while using a condom. The other man did not contract HIV as a result
of their encounter.1 In Illinois, an HIV-positive sex worker was jailed after
failing to disclose her HIV status to a patron even though a condom
wrapper was found at the scene.2 And even when a local Georgia
newspaper had previously published a front-page story about how a woman
was living with HIV, a jury still convicted her of HIV nondisclosure,
discrediting the evidence she offered that her boyfriend was aware of her
status.3
1

See Mary Stegmeir, HIV Case Brings 25-Year Sentence, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS COURIER,
May 3, 2009, at B3; Lynda Waddington, HIV-Positive Man’s Prison Sentence Shines Light on Iowa
Law, IOWA INDEP. (June 29, 2009, 10:14 AM), http://iowaindependent.com/16351/hiv-positive-mansprison-sentence-shines-light-on-iowa-law. Rhoades has since appealed his conviction. See Proof Brief
of Applicant/Appellant and Request for Oral Argument, Rhoades v. State, No. 12-0180 (Iowa June 13,
2012).
2
See Mark Shuman, Prostitution Suspect Faces HIV Charge, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1999, § 2, at 2.
3
See Ginn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (crediting the victim’s and two
witnesses’ testimony over the testimony of Ginn and other witnesses). Prosecutions have also taken
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Thirty-four states4 and two United States territories5 have criminal
statutes or sentencing enhancements that explicitly authorize such
prosecutions. These statutes specifically impose criminal liability for
HIV/AIDS6 transmission, exposure,7 or nondisclosure. Arkansas’s statute,
for example, states that “[a] person commits the offense of exposing
another person to [HIV] if the person knows he or she has tested positive
for [HIV] and . . . engages in sexual penetration with another person
without first having informed the other person of the presence of [HIV].”8
“[S]exual penetration,” under Arkansas’s statute, not only means sexual
intercourse but also “any other intrusion, however slight, . . . of any object
into a genital or anal opening of another person’s body.”9 The “emission of

place in other states for conduct that poses little or no risk of transmission. See, e.g., People v. Hall, No.
B190199, 2007 WL 2121912, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2007) (affirming the felony conviction of a
sex worker even though she never engaged in any sexual contact with her patron, the undercover police
officer who arrested her); State v. Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 881–83 (Idaho 2008) (affirming the conviction
of an HIV-positive man who performed oral sex on another person).
4
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-123 (2006), 20-15-903 (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 1621.5 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013), 120291 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 647f (West
2010), 12022.85 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.0041(11)(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013),
775.0877 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013), 796.08(5) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39601 (2011 & Supp. 2012), -608 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01 (West Supp. 2012); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1, 16-41-14-17 (West 2007), 35-42-1-7 (West 2012 & Supp. 2012), 35-42-1-9
(West 2012), 35-42-2-6(e)–(f) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012), 35-45-16-2(a)–(b), -2(d) (West 2012); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–
GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.5210 (West 2001), .11101 (West
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2241 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 191.677 (West 2011), 565.085
(West 2012), 567.020 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-25, -144 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-17 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-60, -140, -145 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.267.4:1(A)–(B) (2009), 32.1-289.2 (2011); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2011). For a
comprehensive table listing states that have statutes criminalizing HIV exposure and transmission, see
1 CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, ENDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST HIV CRIMINALIZATION: A
MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES: STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS 202–05 (2010). Although
many of these statutes criminalize HIV exposure through nonsexual means, such as spitting, biting, and
donating blood, this Note focuses only on HIV exposure through sexual contact.
5
9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.10 (1996); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 888 (2012).
6
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the virus that causes acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS). Together, they are referred to as “HIV/AIDS.” See Basic Information About HIV and
AIDS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.
htm#hiv (last modified Apr. 11, 2012) (describing HIV transmission, testing, and prevention).
7
For the purposes of this Note, I use the term “transmission” to refer to conduct that results in
actual HIV infection. I use “exposure” to describe conduct that poses a risk of infection but that does
not necessarily result in actual infection. Many states’ statutes, however, use the terms “exposure” and
“transmission” interchangeably. For example, Illinois has titled its HIV-specific statute “Criminal
Transmission of HIV” even though actual infection is not an element of the offense. See 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(c) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require that an infection with
HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed criminal transmission of HIV.”).
8
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b).
9
Id. § 5-14-123(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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semen is not required” to complete the offense.10 Arkansas’s statute does
not provide a defense for condom use or the absence of HIV transmission.
Proponents of these statutes argue that HIV-positive individuals
should be punished for not disclosing their status to sexual partners11 and
that the deterrent effect of criminalization promotes public health and
prevention strategies.12 At the same time, many commentators have also
recognized that these statutes fuel stigmatization and fear of people living
with HIV.13 These statutes may also undermine public health goals14 and
fail to influence individuals’ behavior.15
When the disease was first recognized three decades ago,16 HIV/AIDS
was a “puzzle” to doctors.17 In the early 1990s, when most HIV-specific
statutes were adopted, effective antiretroviral drugs were not yet widely

10

Id. § 5-14-123(c)(2).
See, e.g., Isabel Grant, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization of the NonDisclosure of HIV, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 123, 177 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of “retribution and
the denunciatory function of law”); Sara Klemm, Comment, Keeping Prevention in the Crosshairs: A
Better HIV Exposure Law for Maryland, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 495, 518 (2010) (“[A] person
who recklessly or intentionally exposes another to a fatal disease commits a wrong that warrants the
social condemnation that a criminal statute represents.”).
12
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC 130 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT], available at http://ia700402.us.archive.org/14/items/
reportofpresiden00pres/reportofpresiden00pres.pdf (“Establishing criminal penalties for failure to
comply with clearly set standards of conduct can also deter HIV-infected individuals from engaging in
high-risk behaviors, thus protecting society against the spread of the disease.”).
13
See, e.g., JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), CRIMINAL LAW,
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HIV TRANSMISSION: A POLICY OPTIONS PAPER 6 (2002) [hereinafter
UNAIDS PAPER], available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub02/jc733-criminallaw_en.pdf
(“Appealing to a desire for retribution in making policy runs the risk of appealing to prejudice and
reinforcing discrimination, particularly in the context of the heavy stigma that already often surrounds
HIV/AIDS and those individuals or groups associated with it.”); Michael L. Closen et al., Discussion,
Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921, 962
(1994) (“Isolating HIV-AIDS for criminalization is one more kind of stigmatization that is not needed
for an epidemic that has been plagued by hysteria.”); Sean Strub, Ctr. for HIV Law & Policy, AIDS
Stigma and the Creation of a Viral Underclass, http://www.equalitygiving.org/files/eQualityThinkingWhy-HIV-Criminalization-Matters/HIV%20CrimBackgrounder_StrubNov11.pdf (discussing how HIV
criminalization fuels the stigma associated with HIV).
14
See, e.g., Rebecca Bennett, Should We Criminalize HIV Transmission?, in THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE 225, 227 (Charles A. Erin & Suzanne Ost eds., 2007); Klemm,
supra note 11, at 510 (“[T]here is a real danger that these laws communicate messages that at best
undermine, and at worst run directly counter to, public health efforts to combat the spread of HIV.”).
15
See, e.g., UNAIDS PAPER, supra note 13 (“[I]t is unclear whether criminal sanctions will, in
practice, act as a significant deterrent to behaviour that may result in HIV transmission.”).
16
The first news story published about the disease appeared in the New York Native on May 18,
1981. See LARRY GROSS, UP FROM INVISIBILITY: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE MEDIA IN AMERICA
95 (2001).
17
Jack Begg, 20 Years Ago, the First Clues to the Birth of a Plague, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at
WK7 (“AIDS. The acronym alone defines a generation. But 20 years ago, the disease was a puzzle.”).
11
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available.18 Although HIV was “invariably fatal”19 in the early stages of the
epidemic, medical advances have since made the disease highly treatable.20
Unfortunately, most HIV-specific statutes have not evolved at the same
pace as science.21
In recent years, however, momentum has been growing to reform
these outdated statutes. In 2010, the Obama Administration released a
report encouraging state legislatures to review their HIV-specific statutes
“to ensure that they are consistent with current knowledge of HIV
transmission and support public health approaches to preventing and
treating HIV.”22 On September 23, 2011, Representative Barbara Lee of
California introduced the Repeal Existing Policies that Encourage and
Allow Legal HIV Discrimination Act (REPEAL Act).23 The REPEAL Act
would require the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Secretary of Defense to work with state officials,
organizations, and others to analyze “[f]ederal and [s]tate laws, policies,
regulations, and judicial precedents and decisions regarding criminal and
related civil commitment cases involving people living with HIV/AIDS.”24
Following this review, the Attorney General would then provide a report on
the study’s findings, including a set of recommendations for state
governments.25 Federal funding would also be available to help state and
local governments and other organizations implement these
18

See Repeal Existing Policies that Encourage and Allow Legal HIV Discrimination Act
(REPEAL Act), H.R. 3053, 112th Cong. § 3(1) (2011).
19
Lawrence K. Altman, Promise and Peril of New Drugs for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, at
F1.
20
See William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed., AIDS Is Not a Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2002, at C9 (“[M]edicine can turn AIDS from a death sentence into a chronic illness . . . .”).
Unfortunately, access to treatment is still a challenge in other parts of the world. See Josh Ruxin, AIDS
Is Still a Crisis. Is Anyone Really Surprised?, N.Y. TIMES ON THE GROUND (May 24, 2010, 5:41 PM),
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/aids-is-still-a-crisis-is-anyone-really-surprised/.
21
See REPEAL Act § 3(7) (“State and Federal law does not currently reflect the medical advances
and discoveries made with regards to HIV/AIDS.”); James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The
Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 707
(2009) (“The HIV/AIDS epidemic is changing, but the criminal law is failing to keep pace.” (footnote
omitted)).
22
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE
UNITED STATES 37 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/NHAS.
pdf.
23
See REPEAL Act. For commentary on the REPEAL Act, see Press Release, Lambda Legal,
Positive Justice Project Members Endorse REPEAL HIV Discrimination Act (Sept. 23, 2011), available
at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_20110923_positive-justice-project; Ian S. Thompson, New
Legislation Shines Light on the Criminalization of HIV, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Sept. 23, 2011, 4:18
PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/hiv-aids/new-legislation-shines-light-criminalization-hiv; Why Federal
Legislation Matters: The REPEAL HIV Discrimination Act, CENTER FOR HIV L. & POL’Y (Sept. 26,
2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/posts/view/113.
24
See REPEAL Act § 5(a)(1)–(2).
25
Id. § 5(b).
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recommendations.26 If passed,27 the REPEAL Act would be the first federal
law to address the problems that have developed as a result of HIV
criminalization.28
The criminalization of HIV exposure has already received
considerable treatment in legal scholarship.29 This Note expands the
existing analysis by exploring the appropriate role of the federal
government in guiding national reform. Specifically, this Note discusses
the historical role of federal guidelines in shaping the national trajectory of
HIV-criminalization legislation and offers possible alternative approaches
to reforming such guidelines that might encourage nationwide reform at the
state level. This Note begins in Part I by discussing the current reality of
HIV/AIDS in the United States. This background contextualizes why it is
necessary to reform HIV-specific statutes. Next, Part II examines the
federal government’s two previous sets of federal guidelines for HIV
criminalization, specifically, the Presidential Commission Report of 198830
and the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990.31 By exploring the problems
related to HIV-specific state statutes, Part III then demonstrates that both
the Presidential Commission and the CARE Act provided inadequate
guidance. Finally, Part IV proposes alternative approaches the federal
government could promote under the REPEAL Act.
I. THE REALITY OF HIV/AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that
more than one million people in the United States are currently living with
HIV.32 Every year, approximately 50,000 Americans become infected.33
And in the United States, nearly 636,000 individuals with AIDS have died

26

Id. § 6.
At the time of publication, the REPEAL Act was still pending in committee.
28
See Why Federal Legislation Matters, supra note 23.
29
See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law: Statutory Issues,
Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 47; Michael L. Closen &
Jeffrey S. Deutschman, A Proposal to Repeal the Illinois HIV Transmission Statute, 78 ILL. B.J. 592
(1990); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327 (2004); Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517
(2012); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988); Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is There a
Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821 (2004); Amy L. McGuire,
Comment, AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal Prosecution of HIV Exposure, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1787 (1999).
30
REPORT, supra note 12, at 130–31.
31
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CARE Act].
32
NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD & TB PREVENTION, HIV IN THE UNITED
STATES: AT A GLANCE 1 (2013) [hereinafter HIV IN THE U.S.], available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
pdf/statistics_basics_factsheet.pdf.
33
Id.
27
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since the start of the epidemic.34 Although gay, bisexual, and other men
who have sex with men comprise a majority of the new HIV infections
every year,35 the disease affects a cross section of American society.36
Approximately 80% of new HIV infections in the United States result
from sexual exposure.37 Contributing to this problem, 18% of HIV-positive
individuals are unaware of their HIV status,38 and a recent study found that
such individuals account for most new HIV infections.39 Additionally, 40%
of individuals who are aware of their HIV status do not notify their sexual
partners that they have HIV.40
The CDC has explained in simplified terms that “HIV is spread by
sexual contact with an infected person.”41 But not all sexual contact
presents the same degree of risk, and some forms of sexual contact pose
almost no risk at all because they do not involve the exchange of blood,
semen, or vaginal fluid.42 Indeed, choice of sex act and condom use both
influence the risk of transmission.43 The risk of transmission, even for the
riskiest behavior, is likely lower than commonly believed. For example, the
riskiest sex act—unprotected anal sex when the insertive partner is HIV

34

Id.
Id. (noting that 63% of new infections are found in gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex
with men). The rates of infection among people of color are also disproportionately higher. For
example, although blacks account for around 12% of the population in the United States, they
represented nearly half (44%) of new HIV infections in 2010. See id. at 2.
36
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In AIDS War, New Weapons and New Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2001, at 1 (explaining that HIV also affects women, intravenous drug users, blacks, whites, and
Hispanics of all socioeconomic levels).
37
Gary Marks, Nicole Crepaz & Robert S. Janssen, Estimating Sexual Transmission of HIV from
Persons Aware and Unaware that They Are Infected with the Virus in the USA, 20 AIDS 1447, 1449
(2006).
38
HIV IN THE U.S., supra note 32; see also Richard Knox, Many Americans with HIV Don’t Know
They Have It, NPR (Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97315837
(“More than 20 percent of people with HIV—more than 200,000 people—are unaware they’re
infected, . . . slightly better than the 25 percent ‘unaware’ rate of 2005.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
39
Marks, Crepaz & Janssen, supra note 37, at 1448–49 (“[W]e conservatively estimate that just
over half of new sexually transmitted HIV infections in the USA stem from . . . infected persons in the
USA who are unaware of their [HIV] status.”).
40
Mike Allen et al., Persons Living with HIV: Disclosure to Sexual Partners, 25 COMM. RES.
REPS. 192, 196 (2008).
41
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION 1 (1999), available
at http://img.thebody.com/cdc/pdfs/transmission.pdf.
42
See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 329–30 (discussing how various state statutes
presumably criminalize using noncontaminated sex toys, engaging in manual or digital stimulation of a
partner, and kissing, though these acts pose almost no risk of transmission).
43
See Beena Varghese et al., Reducing the Risk of Sexual HIV Transmission: Quantifying the PerAct Risk for HIV on the Basis of Choice of Partner, Sex Act, and Condom Use, 29 SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 38 (2002).
35
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positive—carries about a 1-in-50 probability of transmission.44 The risk
decreases to nearly 1 in 2000 if the HIV-positive individual is the receptive
partner during unprotected anal sex.45 The risks involved with unprotected
vaginal sex are also relatively low—“approximately 1 in 1000 for male-tofemale transmission and 1 in 2000 for female-to-male transmission.”46 The
risk associated with unprotected oral sex has been more difficult to
quantify; however, most studies agree that oral sex presents a lower risk of
transmission than anal or vaginal sex.47 Correct and consistent condom use
reduces the risk of transmission by at least 90% to 95%.48 Thus, the risk of
an HIV-positive man “transmitting the virus to his partner during a single
act of condom-protected anal intercourse is 1 in 500 if the infected man is
the insertive partner and 1 in 20,000 if he is the receptive partner.”49 As
these statistics demonstrate, transmission of HIV, even through the riskiest
sexual contact, is not as easy as it was once assumed to be.
Even when HIV is transmitted, however, there are an increasing
number of treatments available. Since the discovery of the virus three
decades ago, medical experts have made tremendous advances in
developing treatments that delay the progression of HIV to AIDS.50 Today,
44

Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 328; see also Varghese et al., supra note 43, at 40 (peract risk of HIV infection of 5 in 1000); Eric Vittinghoff et al., Per-Contact Risk of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Between Male Sexual Partners, 150 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
306, 309 (1999) (per-contact risk of 0.82%). Although these per-act numbers may seem low, the
cumulative risk of transmission increases with every sexual contact. See Varghese et al., supra note 43,
at 41.
45
Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 328; see also Vittinghoff et al., supra note 44 (estimating
a per-contact risk of 0.06%).
46
Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 328 (footnote omitted); see also Marie-Claude Boily et
al., Heterosexual Risk of HIV-1 Infection per Sexual Act: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of
Observational Studies, 9 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 118, 122 (2009) (estimating 0.04% per-act risk
for female-to-male transmission and 0.08% per-act risk for male-to-female transmission in high-income
countries). As of 2006, the CDC reported that there were “no confirmed cases of female-to-female
sexual transmission.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS AMONG WOMEN WHO
HAVE SEX WITH WOMEN 1 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/women/resources/fact
sheets/pdf/wsw.pdf.
47
See Rebecca F. Baggaley, Richard G. White & Marie-Claude Boily, Systematic Review of
Orogenital HIV-1 Transmission Probabilities, 37 INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1255, 1255 (2008); Jorge
del Romero et al., Evaluating the Risk of HIV Transmission Through Unprotected Orogenital Sex,
16 AIDS 1296, 1296 (2002). Unprotected oral sex where the receptive partner—the individual receiving
oral stimulation—is HIV positive, however, is not negligible. See Vittinghoff et al., supra note 44
(estimating that the per-contact risk for unprotected receptive oral sex is 0.06% or less).
48
Steven D. Pinkerton & Paul R. Abramson, Condoms and the Prevention of AIDS, 85 AM.
SCIENTIST 364, 368 (1997) (“When used consistently and correctly, the effectiveness of condoms is
probably much greater than these figures imply—as much as 99.5 percent.”).
49
Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 328.
50
There are currently thirty-one FDA-approved antiretroviral medications. See AIDSINFO, FDAAPPROVED ANTI-HIV MEDICATIONS (2012), available at http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/
ApprovedMedstoTreatHIV_FS_en.pdf; see also Jay A. Levy, Not an HIV Cure, but Encouraging New
Directions, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 724, 724 (2009) (“Currently, infected patients can benefit from
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an antiretroviral drug regimen, which involves taking a combination of
three or more drugs that attack the virus and prevent it from multiplying, is
typically prescribed.51 Although these treatments are not a cure,52 they have
transformed HIV from a “death sentence” into a chronic illness.53 Since
1996, the life expectancy of HIV-positive individuals has more than
doubled,54 and individuals who are still asymptomatic when diagnosed have
life expectancies that are approaching that of the general population.55
Research has shown that these drugs may even reduce the risk of
transmission by decreasing an individual’s viral load to almost undetectable
levels.56 Unfortunately, HIV-specific statutes have not evolved at the same
pace as this ever-increasing wealth of knowledge about infectivity and
treatment.57 As the REPEAL Act recognized, “State and Federal law does
not currently reflect the medical advances and discoveries made with
regards to HIV/AIDS.”58
II. A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ENDORSEMENT OF
HIV CRIMINALIZATION
The public hysteria that emerged at the beginning of the HIV/AIDS
crisis led many lawmakers to expand the response to the disease beyond

antiretroviral therapies that effectively delay or prevent progression to AIDS. These people are in many
cases healthy but continue to carry HIV.” (footnote omitted)).
51
See AIDSINFO, supra note 50; Julio S.G. Montaner et al., Association of Highly Active
Antiretroviral Therapy Coverage, Population Viral Load, and Yearly New HIV Diagnoses in British
Columbia, Canada: A Population-Based Study, 376 LANCET 532, 532 (2010). The FDA also recently
approved the use of Truvada, an antiretroviral drug, as a prophylactic measure for people who are at a
higher risk for HIV infection. See Drug Approved to Fight H.I.V. Infection, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012,
at A16; see also J.M. Baeten et al., Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Heterosexual Men
and Women, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 399 (2012) (finding that antiretroviral prophylaxis reduced the
rate of HIV transmission by about 67%–75%).
52
Although no cure has been identified yet, researchers are still hopeful. See Erin Loury, Berlin
Patient, First Person Cured of HIV, May Soon Have Company, L.A. TIMES BOOSTER SHOTS
(July 27, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/health/boostershots/la-heb-hiv-cure-aids-meeting-20120727,0,
960052.story.
53
See Clinton, supra note 20.
54
See Kathleen McDavid Harrison, Ruiguang Song & Xinjian Zhang, Life Expectancy After HIV
Diagnosis Based on National HIV Surveillance Data from 25 States, United States, 53 J. AIDS 124, 125
(2010).
55
See Ard van Sighem et al., Life Expectancy of Recently Diagnosed Asymptomatic HIV-Infected
Patients Approaches that of Uninfected Individuals, 24 AIDS 1527, 1528 (2010).
56
See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Early Therapy for H.I.V. Said to Cut Spread, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2011, at A1; Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Treating HIV-Infected People
with Antiretrovirals Protects Partners from Infection (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.niaid.nih.
gov/news/newsreleases/2011/Pages/HPTN052.aspx.
57
See McArthur, supra note 21.
58
REPEAL Act, H.R. 3053, 112th Cong. § 3(7) (2011).
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traditional public health measures59 and to enact HIV-specific statutes.60
The federal government supported this approach. This Part focuses on the
two major federal endorsements of HIV criminalization—the Presidential
Commission Report of 1988 and the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990.
A. The Presidential Commission Report of 1988
In 1987, President Ronald Reagan formed the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (the
Presidential Commission).61 The Presidential Commission was tasked not
only with evaluating existing efforts to combat HIV but also with making
recommendations for future government action.62 In 1988, the year
following its creation, the Presidential Commission published a report
comprised of twenty major findings along with hundreds of
recommendations intended to comprise the national strategy for responding
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.63 In a short, two-page section,64 the Presidential
Commission specifically addressed the issue of criminalizing HIV
transmission65 and encouraged state governments “to explore the use of the
criminal law in the face of this epidemic.”66 The Presidential Commission
cautioned, however, that criminal sanctions should function as a last resort,
to be employed only after public health measures and other civil remedies
failed to reduce HIV-transmission rates.67
The Presidential Commission specifically criticized the use of general
criminal laws, such as murder or assault statutes, to criminalize intentional
HIV transmission and instead recommended that states consider
implementing HIV-specific statutes.68 It argued that the intent and
causation requirements of murder statutes were too difficult to prove in a
prosecution for HIV transmission and that the penalties for assault were not
59

See generally Sullivan & Field, supra note 29 (discussing quarantine and criminalization as
responses to AIDS).
60
Cf. Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons from History and a
Model for the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 245 (1992) (comparing the responses to
syphilis and AIDS).
61
Exec. Order No. 12,601, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (June 29, 1987).
62
Id.
63
See REPORT, supra note 12.
64
See id. at 130–31.
65
Although the section on criminalization was titled “Criminalization of HIV Transmission,” id. at
130, the Presidential Commission likely intended its recommendations to apply to HIV exposure as
well. It recommended that HIV-specific criminal statutes be “directed to those HIV-infected individuals
who know of their status and engage in behaviors which they know are . . . likely to result in
transmission of HIV.” Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Because the report used the word “transmission,”
this Note will likewise use that terminology when discussing the report.
66
Id. at 130.
67
See id.
68
See id.
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stringent enough, especially in the case of intentional transmission.69 In
contrast, the report reasoned that HIV-specific statutes “would provide
clear notice of socially unacceptable standards of behavior specific to the
HIV epidemic and tailor punishment to the specific crime of HIV
transmission.”70 Ultimately, the Presidential Commission believed that the
implementation of criminal penalties for intentional HIV transmission
would deter high-risk behaviors and serve a public health function by
preventing the spread of HIV.71
The Presidential Commission recognized that relying on
criminalization as a prevention strategy could be problematic. The report
listed five possible “obstacles to progress.”72 First, it again noted that
traditional criminal laws were not “well suited” to HIV-transmission
prosecutions.73 Second, the report stated that prostitution penalties were
“too lenient” and that enforcement of prostitution laws was “erratic.”74
Third, the Presidential Commission expressed public health concerns.
Adopting criminal sanctions for HIV transmission could divert resources
away from effective public health prevention policies.75 The report even
cautioned that criminal sanctions could discourage people from undergoing
HIV testing.76 Fourth, the Presidential Commission recognized that many
view criminal sanctions as primarily punitive77 and as failing to serve as
effective deterrents for HIV-positive individuals.78 Finally, the Presidential
Commission acknowledged the dangers of “intrusive policing” and

69

See id.
Id.
71
See id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See id. Other commentators raised this same concern. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS:
Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1058 (1989)
(“Public policy aimed at isolating or criminalizing AIDS transmission may appear to be getting tough
with the disease. But they divert our attention and resources from the policies that would make a real
difference—focused education, testing, counseling, and treatment for drug dependency.”); Scott A.
McCabe, Rejecting Inference of Intent to Murder for Knowingly Exposing Another to a Risk of HIV
Transmission, 56 MD. L. REV. 762, 775 (1997) (“Criminalization . . . may divert limited resources away
from testing, treatment, and educational programs in order to pay lawyers fees, court costs, and prison
expenses.”).
76
See REPORT, supra note 12; see also Klemm, supra note 11, at 508–09 (discussing concerns that
criminal HIV-exposure laws discourage testing); Erin M. O’Toole, Note, HIV-Specific Crime
Legislation: Targeting an Epidemic for Criminal Prosecution, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 183, 201 (1995–1996)
(“HIV-specific crime statutes which authorize disclosure of confidential voluntary HIV test results
might serve to actually increase the public health risk by discouraging voluntary testing.”). But cf.
Klemm, supra note 11, at 509 & n.114 (suggesting that HIV statutes may not actually have this effect).
77
See generally J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis,
27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435 (1994) (discussing the general theories for criminalizing HIV exposure).
78
See REPORT, supra note 12.
70
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“selective prosecution,” especially as a means to “harass unpopular
groups.”79
To address these obstacles to progress, the Presidential Commission
provided recommendations for HIV-specific statutes. The report
recommended that these statutes should only apply to people who have
actual knowledge of their HIV-positive status.80 Furthermore, the statutes
should only criminalize behaviors that are “scientifically established
mode[s] of transmission” or that are “likely to result in transmission of
HIV” “according to scientific research.”81 To that end, the statutes should
provide clear notice of specific behaviors that may subject an individual to
criminal sanctions.82 In the context of sexual transmission, the Presidential
Commission recommended that statutes specifically impose an affirmative
duty on HIV-positive individuals to disclose their HIV status to sex
partners, to obtain their partners’ consent, and to use precautions.83 Thus,
under the recommendations, only individuals who failed to perform these
duties would face prosecution.84 Consistent with its emphasis on not
substituting criminalization for traditional public health efforts, the
Presidential Commission also recommended that prosecutors always
consult public health officials to discuss other alternatives or interventions
before proceeding with an HIV-transmission prosecution.85 In sum, the
Presidential Commission’s recommendations emphasized the need for
affirmative defenses, collaboration with public health officials, and clear
notice of scientifically established high-risk behavior.
The Presidential Commission’s recommendations were a meritorious
first attempt to set a national HIV/AIDS strategy. Because it is debatable
whether the criminal law has any deterrent effect in a public health context,
the recommendations were wise to emphasize that criminal sanctions
should only be an adjunct to public health measures. If, as recommended, a
system were established for prosecutors to consult public health officials
before initiating HIV-transmission prosecutions, less extreme measures

79

Id.; see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 357 (1990) (“There is a concern that such statutes may be selectively
applied against gay men and other minority or unpopular groups.”). Some commentators have drawn
parallels between the selective enforcement of criminal sodomy laws and HIV-exposure statutes,
arguing that they “could become a tool of official persecution—an outlet for irrational fear and hostility
toward gay men.” Sullivan & Field, supra note 29, at 189–90; see also Wolf & Vezina, supra note 29,
at 871 (“The selection of cases for prosecution may be discriminatory, as has occurred with some
sodomy prosecutions.”).
80
See REPORT, supra note 12, at 131.
81
Id.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
See id.
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could be explored first, leaving criminal sanctions only for those extreme
cases warranting a heightened response.
As later illustrated by the development of HIV-criminalization statutes
at the state level,86 however, the Presidential Commission’s report did not
provide adequate guidelines for developing appropriate HIV-specific
statutes. First, although the report’s broad language concerning
scientifically established modes of transmission would provide states the
flexibility to update their HIV statutes as science evolved,87 this broad
language was also unnecessarily vague. The recommendations themselves
failed to specifically list which high-risk behaviors could be targeted. In
1988, when the report was released, HIV was still widely misunderstood,
and many were still unaware of which activities constituted scientifically
established modes of transmission. Without clear guidance, the Presidential
Commission overlooked an important opportunity to provide accurate
information about the actual methods of HIV transmission.
Second, the report’s extension of criminal liability only to those HIVpositive individuals who know their status is problematic from a public
health perspective. As noted in the report’s “obstacles to progress,”
imposing criminal sanctions only on those individuals who know their
status could discourage people from undergoing HIV testing.88 As a result,
it is debatable whether the recommended criminal sanctions would even
have the desired deterrent effect and prevent the spread of the disease
because any reduction in the number of transmissions attributable to the
implementation of criminal liability may be outweighed by an increase in
transmissions owing to decreases in HIV testing.
In the end, because the Presidential Commission had no authority to
authorize funding to help states implement its recommendations, the
success of its report depended largely on whether it received support from
Congress. As discussed below, Congress did ultimately support the
criminalization of HIV exposure.89 Contrary to the Presidential
Commission’s report, however, Congress’s requirements did not emphasize
limiting HIV criminalization to scientifically established modes of
transmission. Thus, as this Note demonstrates, many states’ statutes have
since undermined the public health strategies designed to prevent the
spread of HIV.90
86

See infra Part III.
James McArthur argues that a “generalizing statute” could be beneficial because it would “avoid
obsolescence as the HIV/AIDS epidemic changes.” McArthur, supra note 21, at 738. In contrast, a
“specifying reform” could be problematic because “defining behavior in the context of a changing
epidemic carries the significant risk of over- or underbreadth should new events change the epidemic
even further.” Id. at 737.
88
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89
See infra Part II.B.
90
See infra Part III.
87
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B. The Ryan White CARE Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress supported the Commission’s recommendations by
passing the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act
of 1990 (the CARE Act).91 The CARE Act was designed to provide
emergency financial assistance to state and local governments providing
services to HIV-positive individuals and families.92 Under the CARE Act,
however, states would only receive federal funding for HIV/AIDS
prevention and relief after demonstrating that “the criminal laws of the
State are adequate to prosecute [intentional HIV exposure].”93 Although a
state could satisfy this requirement by enacting an HIV-specific statute, a
state could also comply with the requirement if its general criminal laws
could apply to intentional transmission.94 A third option was for states to
include HIV in the definition of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) that
were covered in existing communicable or infectious disease statutes.95
Congress repealed the criminalization mandate in 2000, after all states had
met the requirement, but to this day, states have still kept their HIVspecific laws on the books.96
Although the CARE Act was consistent with the Presidential
Commission report’s recommendation to rely on criminal prosecution as a
prevention measure, the CARE Act ignored many of the report’s specific
recommendations. The CARE Act identified three means of transmission
that state laws must cover: donation of blood, semen, or breast milk; sexual
activity; and intravenous drug use.97 But none of the subsections addressing
these activities listed any specific behaviors or made any reference to
whether the challenged conduct must be a scientifically established mode
of transmission. For example, the CARE Act only required that state
criminal laws be an adequate means to prosecute HIV-positive individuals
who engage in “sexual activity,” have knowledge of their HIV status, and
intend to expose another to HIV.98 Contrary to the Presidential
Commission’s recommendations, the CARE Act did not require states to
91

Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a more
comprehensive discussion of the CARE Act, see Raymond C. O’Brien, A Legislative Initiative: The
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 183 (1991). The Act was named after an HIV-positive teenager who fought to attend public
school after the superintendant of his school banned him from attending classes because of his HIV
status. See Dirk Johnson, Ryan White Dies of AIDS at 18; His Struggle Helped Pierce Myths, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1990, at D10.
92
See CARE Act § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (2006)).
93
Id. § 2647(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47) (repealed 2000).
94
See id. § 2647(c).
95
See Kenney, supra note 60, at 263.
96
See Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-345, § 301(a), 114 Stat.
1345; Wolf & Vezina, supra note 29, at 840–41.
97
CARE Act § 2647(a)(1)–(3).
98
Id. § 2647(a)(2).
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provide notice of which specific types of “sexual activity” might be subject
to criminal sanction, and it did not require states to limit prosecutions to
scientifically established modes of transmission. Furthermore, unlike the
Presidential Commission report, the CARE Act only required that state
statutes provide an affirmative defense for disclosure and informed
consent.99 The CARE Act neglected to require a defense for individuals
who used appropriate protection. By conditioning federal HIV/AIDS
funding on such requirements, the CARE Act effectively undermined the
Presidential Commission’s more public health-oriented goals. As a result,
many states implemented statutes that criminalized behaviors that were not
scientifically proven to result in HIV transmission.
III. THE NATIONAL LANDSCAPE OF HIV CRIMINALIZATION
The Presidential Commission report and the CARE Act served as an
impetus for many states to implement HIV-specific criminal statutes. While
at least four states had already implemented HIV-exposure statutes in 1988
when the Presidential Commission released its report,100 by 1993, nearly
half the states had HIV-specific statutes.101 And although the
criminalization mandate of the CARE Act was repealed in 2000,102 no state
has since opted to eliminate its HIV-criminalization statute.103 Today,
thirty-four states and two United States territories have HIV-specific
criminal statutes.104
An examination of these statutes reveals that neither the Presidential
Commission report nor the CARE Act provided adequate guidelines for
appropriately developing HIV-specific statutes, highlighting the need for
reformed federal guidelines. This Part discusses the problems associated
with existing HIV-specific criminal statutes. These problems generally fall
into three categories—public health, proof, and proportionality. An analysis
of these issues serves as the foundation in Part IV for exploring the
possibilities for national HIV-criminalization reform.
A. Public Health Problems
Current HIV-specific statutes may impede public health initiatives
intended to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, highlighting the “inevitable
tensions” that exist between criminal and public health approaches.105
Whereas public health initiatives typically emphasize prevention,
99

See id. § 2647(b).
REPORT, supra note 12 (listing Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, and Nevada).
101
REPEAL Act, H.R. 3053, 112th Cong. § 3(6) (2011).
102
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103
See Strub, supra note 13, at 2–3.
104
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive summary of state and federal
laws criminalizing HIV exposure and transmission, see 1 CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, supra note 4.
105
Klemm, supra note 11, at 505.
100
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education, voluntariness, and confidentiality, criminal law generally
focuses on punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.106 Although the
prevention and deterrence goals of these two approaches may complement
each other, many commentators have nevertheless argued that criminal law
inevitably competes with and undermines public health goals.107 UNAIDS,
the joint United Nations program on HIV/AIDS, has argued, for example,
that HIV criminalization potentially undermines public health strategies by
reinforcing stigma, spreading misinformation about the means of
transmission, deterring HIV testing, compromising confidentiality in health
care settings, and creating a false sense of security.108
Although the Presidential Commission envisioned that HIV-specific
statutes would serve as a supplement to public health prevention strategies,
the HIV-specific laws that states implemented have instead undermined
many public health measures. Contrary to the Presidential Commission’s
central recommendations,109 most states’ HIV-specific statutes are not
limited to scientifically established modes of transmission and do not
provide clear notice of which specific behaviors might result in criminal
liability. Most states have also neglected to provide adequate affirmative
defenses. In particular, most states do not classify condom use as an
affirmative defense, even though research shows that using a condom can
significantly reduce the risk of transmission.110 Ultimately, these criminal
statutes have not required collaboration with public health officials and
have thus undermined many public health strategies.
1.

Criminalizing Behaviors that Are Not Scientifically Established
Modes of Transmission.—Many states’ HIV-specific statutes do
not comply with the Presidential Commission’s recommendation that
criminal sanctions only be used to target behaviors that are scientifically
established modes of transmission.111 Instead, these statutes enforce an
overly broad ban on most forms of sexual activity, regardless of the risk
associated with a particular activity. As a result, many statutes conflate
low- and high-risk activities with no-risk activities.

106

See id. at 505–07 (discussing the tensions between public health initiatives and criminal law).
The incapacitation argument may be particularly weak because “those who are convicted, particularly
those who do harbor the intent to infect others, are sent to prison where access to condoms is rare and
rape is a significant problem.” Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).
107
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108
UNAIDS PAPER, supra note 13, at 23–25.
109
See REPORT, supra note 12, at 131 (recommending affirmative duties of disclosure, consent,
and protection, clear notice of scientifically established modes of transmission, and collaboration with
public health officials).
110
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
111
See, e.g., supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. But cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-1(b)
(West 2007) (defining “high risk activity” as “sexual or needle sharing contact that has been
demonstrated epidemiologically to transmit [HIV, AIDS, or Hepatitis B]”).
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Michigan, for example, requires disclosure before almost any type of
sexual contact, including “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s
body.”112 This overly broad statute imposes the same penalty on using an
unshared sex toy113—a sexual activity that poses no risk of transmission—
as it does on engaging in unprotected anal sex. Imposing the same amount
of liability on these two very distinct activities not only leads to “unjust,
absurd results,”114 but it also potentially misleads the public about actual
modes and risks of transmission.
In addition to criminalizing activities that pose no risk of transmission,
many statutes also fail to differentiate between low- and high-risk
activities. Idaho’s statute defines “transfer” of bodily fluid to include not
only engaging in sexual activity by genital–genital and anal–genital contact
but also engaging in oral–genital contact.115 While HIV transmission is still
possible through oral sex, the risk is substantially lower than the risk of
transmission through vaginal or anal sex.116 The risk of transmitting the
virus through oral sex decreases even further if the person making oral
contact is HIV positive.117 Assuming that the mere risk of transmission
justifies criminal sanction, the vast disparity in the degrees of risk
associated with various activities raises questions about whether it is
appropriate to apply equal punishment to all sexual activity. Ultimately, by
failing to take account of the “hierarchy of risk”118 that exists for various
activities, these statutes reduce the incentives for HIV-positive individuals
to engage in safer sex and undermine public health and prevention efforts.
2. Lack of Clear Notice.—In addition to both criminalizing
behaviors that are not modes of transmission and failing to account for
varying degrees of risk, HIV-specific statutes often fail to provide clear
notice of prohibited behavior. This lack of clarity is contrary to the
Presidential Commission report’s recommendation that HIV-exposure
statutes “clearly set[] forth those specific behaviors subject to criminal

112

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210(2) (West 2001) (emphasis added) (defining “sexual
penetration”). Arkansas’s statute has an identical definition of sexual penetration. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-123(c)(1) (2006).
113
See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 329 (“[T]he statutes do not criminalize sharing
objects that have been exposed to the bodily fluids of someone who has HIV. Instead, the statutes
prohibit the ‘intrusion’ of an ‘object’ . . . with no mention of the object being HIV-contaminated or
shared.”).
114
Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial,
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 486 (2007).
115
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(2)(b) (2011).
116
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
117
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
118
Burris et al., supra note 114, at 486 n.98.
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sanctions.”119 Instead, the statutes often closely track the language of the
CARE Act, which made funding contingent on states imposing liability on
any HIV-positive individual who “engages in sexual activity if the
individual knows that he or she is infected with HIV.”120 The CARE Act,
however, failed to define “sexual activity” anywhere in the statute.
Similarly, Illinois’s HIV criminal statute makes it a felony for an HIVpositive individual who is aware of her status to “engage[] in intimate
contact with another.”121 The statute defines “intimate contact with another”
as “the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another
person in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV.”122 While
this language seemingly tracks the Presidential Commission’s
recommendation that statutes only criminalize conduct that is a
scientifically established mode of transmission, the Illinois law
nevertheless illustrates how following the federal recommendation can still
result in statutory language that fails to provide clear notice regarding
which specific sexual conduct may result in transmission and criminal
liability.123
This lack of notice is problematic from a public health perspective
because it tends to encourage speculation about what constitutes criminal
transmission of HIV. Furthermore, the deterrence justification for HIVspecific statutes is weakened if individuals do not have clear notice of
which specific behaviors they should not engage in. Because providing
clear notice could serve an important public health function by providing
accurate information about HIV transmission and thus supplementing
prevention goals, new federal guidelines should provide clearer notice of
prohibited behaviors.
3. Lack of Adequate Affirmative Defenses.—Finally, the affirmative
defenses available under these statutes often do not adequately align with
public health strategies of encouraging safe sex and frequent testing. Most
HIV-specific statutes adhere to the CARE Act’s recommendation of not

119

REPORT, supra note 12, at 131.
CARE Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, § 2647(a)(2), 104 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300ff-47) (not defining “sexual activity” anywhere in the statute) (repealed 2000).
121
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012).
122
Id. § 5/12-5.01(b).
123
Despite the Illinois statute’s vagueness, it has survived constitutional challenges. See People v.
Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. 1994); People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Other
states’ statutes have also survived constitutional challenges. See, e.g., State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360
(Iowa 2001); People v. Jensen, 586 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d
307 (Mo. 1998); State v. Gonzalez, 796 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). See generally Klemm, supra
note 11, at 503 (describing unsuccessful constitutional challenges to HIV-specific statutes in several
states).
120
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criminalizing conduct if there is disclosure and consent.124 States typically
address disclosure either by making nondisclosure a necessary element of
the crime125 or by making disclosure an affirmative defense.126 The
consequence of this statutory choice affects which party has the burden of
proof at trial.127
Regardless of the statutory approach addressing disclosure, some have
challenged whether disclosure is even a proper requirement in the context
of consensual sex.128 First, an HIV-positive individual only has a duty to
disclose her status if she is actually aware of it. Indeed, as foreshadowed in
the “obstacles to progress” that the Presidential Commission identified,
criminalizing nondisclosure could discourage people from getting tested.129
Furthermore, HIV-positive individuals also have an interest in privacy and
autonomy.130 Requiring partner notification may result in subsequent
disclosures and may also “raise[] the prospect of domestic violence, loss of
family and community support, and discrimination.”131 At the same time,
however, sexual partners also have an autonomy interest in making fully
informed sexual choices, and informed consent may not be possible
without disclosure.132 Similarly, proponents of HIV-criminalization statutes
124

See CARE Act § 2647(b) (“The State laws . . . need not apply . . . if the individual who is
subjected to the behavior involved knows that the other individual is infected and provides prior
informed consent to the activity.”).
125
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (2006) (“A person commits the offense of exposing
another person to [HIV] if the person knows he or she has tested positive for [HIV] and . . . engages in
sexual penetration with another person without first having informed the other person of the presence of
[HIV].”).
126
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(d) (“It shall be an affirmative defense that the
person exposed knew that the infected person was infected with HIV, knew that the action could result
in infection with HIV, and consented to the action with that knowledge.”); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709C.1(5) (West 2003) (“It is an affirmative defense that the person exposed to [HIV] knew that the
infected person had a positive [HIV] status at the time of the action of exposure, knew that the action of
exposure could result in transmission of [HIV], and consented to the action of exposure with that
knowledge.”).
127
Where nondisclosure is an element of the crime, the prosecutor will have to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to disclose her HIV status. In a statute that treats disclosure
as an affirmative defense, however, it is the defendant who carries the burden of establishing that she
disclosed her HIV status. In these states, the prosecutor then only has to establish that the defendant
knew she was HIV-positive before engaging in prohibited conduct. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra
note 29, at 333.
128
Cf. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1542 (“[T]he fact finder should also consider the defendant’s
interests in non-disclosure. An HIV-positive individual may have significant interests in keeping her
[HIV] status private.” (footnote omitted)).
129
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
130
See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and
Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification,
5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 66 (1998) (“Persons with infection suggest that principles of respect
for autonomy militate in favor of privacy.”).
131
Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1558.
132
See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 130, at 66–67.
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argue that disclosure and consent provisions help prevent the spread of HIV
by encouraging HIV-positive individuals to be more cautious when
engaging in sexual behavior.133 Ultimately, however, proving disclosure
and consent will be very challenging for HIV-positive defendants who face
juries who often are more sympathetic to victims and are biased against
individuals living with HIV.134 These challenges therefore raise questions
about whether these requirements promote reliable and just results.
Most problematic is the fact that most HIV-specific statutes lack an
affirmative defense for condom use. Missouri’s statute goes so far as to
explicitly bar even the possibility of a condom defense.135 But even absent
an explicit bar, most states have interpreted their statutes not to allow a
condom defense if one is not explicitly provided. In Illinois, for example,
an HIV-positive sex worker was jailed after failing to disclose her status to
a patron. Although police found a condom wrapper at the scene, under the
Illinois statute, a person could be charged with HIV transmission even
when a condom was used.136
Although providing a condom defense might decrease the incentive to
disclose one’s HIV status to sex partners, failing to provide a condom
defense may more greatly undermine public health strategies that promote
safe sex.137 Professor Isabel Grant argues “that encouraging condom use is
so important, and that the use of condoms reduces the risk of transmission
so significantly, that the criminal law should distinguish between protected
and unprotected sex in cases of nondisclosure.”138 The importance of
promoting condom use is also particularly crucial given recent studies that
suggest optimism toward new HIV/AIDS treatments has led to “safer sex
133

See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 333 (“To the extent that the use of condoms or other
prophylactics is a cautionary action, and to the extent that disclosure and informed consent, while not
protective in themselves, will likely lead to a partner requesting less risky behavior, the more cautious a
potential defendant’s behavior is, the less likely it is that he or she is intending to transmit HIV to a
partner.”).
134
See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
135
Missouri’s HIV statute explicitly bars the possibility of a condom defense. See MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 191.677(4) (West 2011). But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a), (b)(2) (West 2012)
(criminalizing only unprotected sex, or “sexual activity without the use of a condom”). Minnesota’s
HIV statute also recognizes the importance of condom use. Although it criminalizes “[s]exual
penetration,” it limits the definition of sexual penetration to certain sexual acts “committed without the
use of a latex or other effective barrier.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2241(1)(e) (West 2009). North
Dakota and North Carolina also provide condom defenses. Their condom defenses, however, are only
available if the HIV-positive individual also disclosed her status. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3)
(2012) (“It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that if the transfer was by sexual
activity, the sexual activity took place between consenting adults after full disclosure of the risk of such
activity and with the use of an appropriate prophylactic device.” (emphasis added)); 10A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 41A.0202 (2007).
136
See Shuman, supra note 2.
137
See Isabel Grant, Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV
Nondisclosure Prosecutions, 54 MCGILL L.J. 389, 400 (2009).
138
Id. at 392.
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fatigue” and increased sexual risk taking.139 Especially considering that the
vast majority of HIV transmission occurs through sexual contact,140 the
effects of these statutes on the rate of condom use must be closely
scrutinized.
B. Proof Problems
The public health problems that HIV-specific statutes create are
exacerbated by credibility and evidentiary problems in HIV-exposure
prosecutions. While the Presidential Commission focused on the types of
conduct that could be criminalized, it failed to provide adequate guidelines
on the procedural aspects of HIV prosecutions. The CARE Act failed in
this regard as well. These proof problems potentially undermine many of
the possible benefits that these statutes could provide.
Credibility is a tremendous hurdle for many HIV-positive defendants.
In many consensual-sex cases, the testimony elicited at trial becomes one
person’s word against another’s.141 For example, in Ginn v. State, a Georgia
court of appeals upheld the conviction of Patrice Ginn, an HIV-positive
woman, for failing to disclose her HIV status to her boyfriend.142 The local
newspaper in Ginn’s town had run a front-page story about her HIV status
before she became involved with her boyfriend.143 Nevertheless, even
though Ginn and two witnesses testified that Ginn’s boyfriend knew she
was HIV positive, the boyfriend testified that Ginn never informed him of
her HIV status.144 Despite overwhelming evidence that her boyfriend knew
of her status, the court affirmed Ginn’s conviction, explaining that there
was at least “some competent evidence support[ing] that Ginn did not
disclose her HIV status to the victim before engaging in sexual
intercourse.”145 Because of the stigma still attached to being HIV positive,
many in Ginn’s position face insurmountable hurdles when trying to
convince a jury of their credibility in the face of conflicting evidence.146
139

David E. Ostrow et al., Attitudes Towards Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy Are Associated
with Sexual Risk Taking Among HIV-Infected and Uninfected Homosexual Men, 16 AIDS 775, 779
(2002). But cf. Burris et al., supra note 114, at 472 (“We see no sign in our data of the phenomenon of
‘moral hazard’—the uninfected taking more chances in the belief that the infected are following legal
rules of condom use or disclosure.”).
140
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
141
See McArthur, supra note 21, at 739.
142
667 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
143
Id. at 713.
144
Id. at 714.
145
Id.
146
In another Georgia case involving similar disclosure issues, an HIV-positive man was sentenced
to two years in prison and eight years of probation for failing to disclose his status to a woman with
whom he had sex at his home, the Rainbow Center—a housing center for people living with HIV. See
Amy Leigh Womack, HIV-Positive Man Jailed for Not Disclosing His Diagnosis, TELEGRAPH
(Macon), Jan. 13, 2009, at 1A.

1423

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In addition to credibility problems, HIV-exposure statutes have also
created evidentiary problems. By focusing almost exclusively on the
defendant’s conduct and knowledge, HIV-exposure statutes tend to ignore
several problematic issues. First, an HIV-positive individual can be
prosecuted under an HIV-exposure statute even if her sex partner was also
HIV positive when they had sex.147 These statutes are silent about whether
the alleged victim’s own HIV status is relevant. While such an approach
may align with a deterrence rationale of seeking to deter nondisclosure, this
approach nevertheless results in criminalizing individuals who have not
caused any harm.
Indeed, these statutes often do not require that a victim become
infected with HIV as a result of the defendant’s conduct.148 Furthermore,
even if transmission does result, these statutes do not require proof that it
was the defendant’s conduct that caused transmission. This evidentiary
problem is particularly apparent under Missouri’s HIV-exposure statute,
which authorizes prosecutions when “[a]nother person provides evidence
of sexual contact with the HIV-infected person after a diagnosis of an HIV
status.”149 Thus, under this statute, the prosecution would simply have to
prove that the complainant had a sexual relationship with the HIV-positive
defendant and that the defendant was aware of her status at the time of the
sexual activity; no evidence as to the actual source of transmission is
required for conviction.150 As this statute demonstrates, particularly in the
context of exposure during consensual sex, focusing only on the conduct of
the HIV-positive defendant undermines the public health strategy of
emphasizing joint sexual responsibility151 and may result in prosecutions
that are unfair to HIV-positive defendants.
C. Proportionality Problems
Finally, by failing to provide sentencing guidelines for HIV-exposure
crimes, the Presidential Commission and the CARE Act have implicitly
promoted inconsistent and disproportionate punishments that are often
fueled by fear and stigma. In the absence of federal sentencing guidelines,

147

Cf. W. Thomas Minahan, Disclosure Before Exposure: A Review of Ohio’s HIV Criminalization
Statutes, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 83, 102 (2009) (“Ironically, under the [Ohio] felonious assault statute as
it is now written, two individuals, who are both infected with HIV, could each be convicted if they have
intimate relations with each other and fail to disclose their [HIV status].”).
148
In fact, several states explicitly state that actual transmission is not an element of the offense.
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(c) (West Supp. 2012) (“Nothing in this Section shall be
construed to require that an infection with HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed
criminal transmission of HIV.”).
149
MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(1)(2)(c)(c) (West 2011).
150
See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, supra note 4, at 102.
151
See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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penalties for HIV-exposure crimes are inconsistent from state to state.152
Even within a single state, however, many statutes result in
disproportionate punishment. States have generally followed the
recommendation of the Presidential Commission by establishing
knowledge of HIV status as sufficient mens rea for the crime.153 As a result,
statutes assign the same punishment to an individual who is reckless as to
an individual who acts with the specific intent to transmit the virus.154 In
contrast, the CARE Act recommended that only defendants who intend to
expose another to HIV should be liable.155 But even in states that have HIVexposure statutes that dictate that “[n]o person shall intentionally expose
another to any [AIDS] virus,”156 courts have interpreted the intent element
not to require intent to expose another to HIV or to transmit the virus, but
to instead mean intent to engage in the conduct proscribed by the statute.157
Thus, these statutes often fail to impose varying degrees of punishments
depending on the defendant’s culpability or the harm the defendant caused.
Additionally, these statutes often authorize disproportionate sentences
compared to other comparable crimes. Some scholars have compared the
sentences available for HIV exposure and drunk driving. Both crimes are
recklessness crimes, where a defendant can be found liable absent actual
harm simply by creating a risk of serious harm.158 Nevertheless, maximum
sentences for a first drunk driving offense are generally no longer than a
152

Cf. Closen et al., supra note 13, at 954 (“If conduct is offensive in some manner, it should be
consistently offensive across the board. It should not be more offensive in Illinois than it is in Florida.
However, there is no consistency in the potential punishment for essentially the same acts from state to
state.”). Compare IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1 (West 2003), 902.9 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013)
(classifying HIV exposure as a class B felony subject to imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years),
with MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 18-601.1(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (classifying HIV exposure as a
misdemeanor subject to imprisonment not to exceed three years).
153
See REPORT, supra note 12, at 131; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (2006) (“A person
commits the offense of exposing another person to [HIV] if the person knows he or she has tested
positive for [HIV] and . . . engages in sexual penetration with another person without first having
informed the other person of the presence of [HIV].” (emphasis added)).
154
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1532 (noting that extending liability based solely on knowledge of
status “includes within its sweep those without a blameworthy mental state as to transmission while
excluding some individuals who are reckless or intend to transmit. It also results in disproportionate
punishment by failing to distinguish individuals who intend harm from those who are merely reckless or
negligent.”).
155
CARE Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, § 2647(a)(2), 104 Stat. 576 (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 300ff-47 (2006)) (stating that criminal laws should be available to prosecute an HIV-positive
individual who “engages in sexual activity if the individual knows that he or she is infected with HIV
and intends, through such sexual activity, to expose another to HIV” (emphasis added)).
156
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5(A) (2007) (emphasis added).
157
See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 844 So. 2d 263, 272 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“La. R.S. [43.5] does not
require the State to prove that a defendant acted with the specific intent to expose the victim to [HIV];
rather, it requires the State to prove that the defendant intentionally committed an act proscribed by the
statute which exposed the victim to [HIV].”).
158
See Wolf & Vezina, supra note 29, at 872.
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year, while sentences for HIV exposure can range anywhere from five to
twenty-five years or more.159 Another scholar has compared the sentences
available under HIV-exposure statutes and other general endangerment
offenses.160 While HIV-exposure statutes allow for an average maximum
prison sentence of over eleven years, reckless endangerment offenses
typically carry sentences of six months to one year.161 For example, in
North Dakota, an HIV-exposure conviction carries a potential prison
sentence of up to twenty years; yet a reckless endangerment offense, where
“the circumstances manifest [an] extreme indifference to the value of
human life,” carries a maximum sentence of only five years.162
Disproportionate sentencing is also dramatically illustrated by
comparing the sentences authorized for HIV-positive sex workers. For
example, South Carolina’s HIV-exposure statute makes it unlawful for an
HIV-positive individual to “knowingly commit an act of prostitution with
another person.”163 Although an HIV-negative sex worker would only face
a penalty of thirty days to one year in prison,164 an HIV-positive sex worker
could face up to ten years in prison, regardless of whether there was
disclosure, consent, and protection.165 Under South Carolina’s criminal
code, prostitution is defined as “engaging or offering to engage in sexual
activity with or for another in exchange for anything of value.”166 Thus, a
sex worker could be charged with prostitution even before engaging in
sexual activity. But even assuming that an HIV-positive sex worker
engages in sexual activity, the statutory definition of sexual activity could
include conduct that does not pose a risk of transmission.167
Given the broad range of sexual activity that HIV-exposure statutes
typically cover, disproportionate sentences suggest that it is the person’s
HIV status, rather than her specific conduct, that is criminalized. Thus, to
promote uniformity and to avoid punishments that are prompted by fear
and stigma, future federal guidelines should also include clear standards for
appropriate sentencing.

159

See id.
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1536–37 (comparing the sentences for endangerment and HIVexposure offenses in states that proscribe both offenses).
161
See id.
162
Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (2012), with id. § 12.1-17-03 (2012). See generally id.
§ 12.1-32-01 (2012) (defining the penalties for each classification of offense). For a more
comprehensive comparison of possible sentences under various states’ endangerment and HIVexposure statutes, see Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1537–38 tbl.2.
163
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145(2) (2002).
164
Id. § 16-15-110 (2003).
165
Id. § 44-29-145.
166
Id. § 16-15-375(4) (2003) (emphasis added).
167
See id. § 16-15-375(5).
160
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IV. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL GUIDELINES IN PROMOTING NATIONAL
HIV-CRIMINALIZATION REFORM
The Presidential Commission and the Ryan White CARE Act did not
provide adequate guidelines for states to develop appropriate HIVcriminalization statutes. As they exist now, HIV-specific statutes
simultaneously undermine public health measures and fail to adequately
deter high-risk behavior.168 Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV.A, because
general criminal law statutes create many of the same public health and
procedural problems, repealing HIV-specific criminal statutes is not an
adequate solution. Instead, this Note argues that Congress should pass the
REPEAL Act and adopt new federal guidelines that encourage states to
reform, not repeal, their HIV-specific statutes. Because of its focus on the
federal government’s role in shaping states’ HIV-exposure laws, this Note
does not attempt to provide a specific model statute that states should
implement.169 Instead, Part IV.B focuses on the areas in which the Attorney
General and the federal government can encourage positive reform by
providing new HIV-specific guidelines, as would be required under the
REPEAL Act. In particular, the new federal guidelines should encourage
specificity and scientific accuracy, recommend adequate procedural
safeguards, establish guidelines for proportionate punishment, and provide
adequate financial incentives for reform.
A. Repealing HIV-Specific Statutes Is Not a Viable Solution
Repealing HIV-exposure statutes and relying instead on general
criminal laws would not eliminate the problems discussed in Part III of this
Note.170 HIV-exposure prosecutions under general criminal statutes still
present the same public health, proof, and proportionality problems.
Nevertheless, many commentators have recommended this approach,171
arguing that eliminating HIV-specific statutes could help reduce the
stigmatization that these statutes perpetuate.172 Additionally, a traditional
criminal law approach might allow prosecutors to take account of the
168

See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
Cf. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 29, at 331 (“The problem with model statutes is that,
because criminal HIV exposure statutes are by nature political, states not in agreement with the
sympathies of the author of the model statute are left without guidance; yet to provide separate models
of statutes suitable for the needs and goals of the various states in the U.S. would be an arduous task.”).
170
HIV-exposure charges could also be brought under reckless endangerment, assault,
bioterrorism, homicide, and attempted homicide statutes. For an overview of traditional crimes that
might apply to HIV exposure, see Sullivan & Field, supra note 29, at 162–69, and McGuire, supra note
29, at 1795–1802.
171
See, e.g., Minahan, supra note 147, at 106; Jaclyn Schmitt Hermes, Note, The Criminal
Transmission of HIV: A Proposal to Eliminate Iowa’s Statute, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 473, 489
(2002); McArthur, supra note 21; Rebecca Ruby, Note, Apprehending the Weapon Within: The Case
for Criminalizing the Intentional Transmission of HIV, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 313, 325 (1999).
172
See Klemm, supra note 11, at 521.
169
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varying degrees of risk associated with certain conduct.173 Similarly, the
range of culpability requirements in traditional criminal statutes would
allow states to differentiate between reckless or intentional HIV exposure.
Currently, this “spectrum of risk and culpability” is not captured in most
HIV-specific statutes.174
But repealing HIV-specific statutes and instead relying on traditional
criminal law is not a workable solution.175 Prosecuting HIV exposure under
traditional criminal laws suffers from the same problems associated with
prosecution under current HIV-specific statutes. Criminal laws are often
broadly interpreted to sanction conduct that is not a scientifically
established mode of transmission. For example, many HIV-positive
individuals have been charged with aggravated assault for spitting and
biting, with courts finding that HIV constitutes a “deadly weapon.”176
Furthermore, because traditional criminal laws are not specifically designed
to deal with disease exposure or transmission, they too fail to give specific
notice of the types of activities that could lead to criminal liability.
Likewise, because general criminal laws are not specifically designed
for crimes involving sexually transmitted diseases, most do not provide
defenses, such as condom use, that are specific to sexual transmission.
Finally, HIV-positive defendants face the same credibility and evidentiary
problems under general criminal laws. Having identified these problems,
the Presidential Commission recognized that “[t]raditional criminal laws
are not well suited to the prosecution of HIV transmission” and that HIVspecific solutions were necessary.177 Thus, federal lawmakers will have to
do more than simply recommend the repeal of HIV-specific statutes to
correct the problems these statutes have created.
B. Alternative Approaches for Reforming Federal
HIV-Criminalization Guidelines
Because repealing HIV-specific statutes is not an optimal solution,
Congress should pass the REPEAL Act and provide new federal guidelines
to promote national HIV-criminalization reform. There are four main areas
in which revised federal guidelines can encourage improvement. First, new
guidelines should reinforce the original intent of the Presidential
173

See McArthur, supra note 21, at 741.
Klemm, supra note 11, at 521.
175
Many commentators agree. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 79, at 378; Klemm, supra note 11, at
521–22; Jodi Mosiello, Note, Why the Intentional Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) Should Be Criminalized Through the Use of Specific HIV Criminal Statutes, 15 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 595, 610 (1999).
176
See, e.g., State v. Price, 834 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the HIV-positive
appellant’s conviction for felonious assault because “his saliva was a deadly weapon capable of
inflicting physical harm to another”).
177
REPORT, supra note 12.
174
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Commission by encouraging clear notice of scientifically established
modes of transmission. Next, revised guidelines should provide greater
guidance on evidentiary and procedural issues in an effort to combat the
bias that HIV-positive defendants often face at trial. Finally, the federal
government should establish sentencing guidelines to encourage
proportionate punishments and provide adequate financial incentives for
reform.
1.

Providing Adequate Notice of Scientifically Established Modes of
Transmission.—In an effort to eliminate prosecutions for sexual
conduct that does not transmit HIV, new federal guidelines should
encourage states to provide clear notice of conduct that has been
scientifically established as a mode of HIV transmission and that could lead
to criminal liability. Two general approaches are possible, each tracking the
ongoing rules-versus-standards debate in criminal law.178 First, revised
federal guidelines could follow the approach of the Presidential
Commission and maintain a broad standard that recommends criminalizing
only behavior that has been scientifically established as a mode of
transmission.179 For example, the guidelines could encourage only
criminalizing behaviors that the CDC has recognized as a mode of
transmission. Importantly, this approach would allow the guidelines to
adapt to scientific developments and would prevent the need for additional
legislative reform. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III, even a sciencebased standard may not provide sufficient notice of prohibited behavior or
prevent prosecutions for no-risk behaviors.180
Alternatively, the federal guidelines could take a more rules-based
approach, providing a clear list of behaviors that are scientifically
established modes of transmission,181 as well as a list of behaviors that pose
little or no risk of transmission.182 These explicit lists would provide the
clear notice that was lacking in the Presidential Commission’s
178

For a general discussion of this debate, see Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379, 383–90 (1985), and Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 969–96
(1995). For a specific discussion of the rules–standards debate as applied to HIV-exposure laws, see
Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1553–59.
179
Cf. supra note 87.
180
See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois’s vague definition of
“intimate contact”).
181
For example, behaviors on this list might include having unprotected vaginal or anal sex, as
well as having an HIV-positive individual as the receptive partner during unprotected oral sex.
California has taken this approach by limiting its definition of prohibited sexual activity to “insertive
vaginal or anal intercourse on the part of an infected male, receptive consensual vaginal intercourse on
the part of an infected woman with a male partner, or receptive consensual anal intercourse on the part
of an infected man or woman with a male partner.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(b)(1)
(West 2012).
182
Behaviors on this list might include kissing, spitting, biting, masturbation, protected intercourse,
using noncontaminated sex toys, and performing oral sex if one is HIV positive.
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recommendations and in current HIV-specific statutes. In contrast to the
standards approach, providing such lists would “eliminate[] the need to
consider medical evidence of transmission risk” and also protect defendants
by “allow[ing] less fact finder discretion.”183 Clear lists would also serve
the public health function of providing accurate information about which
behaviors pose a higher risk of transmission. If the federal guidelines
contained a greater degree of scientific specificity, they would no longer be
a potential source of misinformation about HIV transmission and would
instead supplement prevention efforts.
In contrast to a standards-based approach, however, this rules-based
strategy could risk over- or underbreadth as the epidemic changes over time
and as new prevention methods and treatments become available.184 One
solution to this problem would be for the federal guidelines to encourage
states to include sunset provisions,185 thus requiring reevaluation of these
lists as the epidemic and medical science evolve.186 Ultimately, because the
standards-based approach taken by the Presidential Commission failed to
prevent prosecutions for conduct that cannot result in HIV transmission,
this rules-based approach may be preferable.
Regardless of whether the guidelines use a standards- or rules-based
approach, federal guidelines should explicitly promote condom use. There
are three approaches the guidelines could take. First, the federal guidelines
could use California’s statute as a model by making “sexual activity
without the use of a condom” an element of the crime.187 But given how
few states have even addressed condom use,188 states may be reluctant to
follow California’s approach. Furthermore, making the absence of
protection an element of the offense risks decreasing an HIV-positive
individual’s motivation to disclose her status to a partner.189 Alternatively,
the guidelines could recommend that states implement an affirmative
defense for condom use.190 Although this second approach does not
183

Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1555.
See id. at 1543; McArthur, supra note 21, at 737.
185
Sunset provisions are “clauses that cause legislation to expire by its own terms.” Rebecca M.
Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 n.4 (2011).
186
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1567–68. Professor Margo Kaplan cautions, however, that sunset
provisions “have significant administrative costs and other detriments” and “may fail to solve the
problem of politically popular but scientifically outdated offenses.” Id. at 1568.
187
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(b)(2) (West 2012) (defining unprotected sexual
activity). Minnesota’s HIV statute takes a similar approach by limiting the definition of sexual
penetration to certain sexual acts “committed without the use of a latex or other effective barrier.”
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2241(1)(e) (West 2009).
188
Only five states have provisions related to condom use. See supra note 135 (discussing the
statutes in Missouri, California, Minnesota, North Carolina, and North Dakota).
189
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
190
North Dakota and North Carolina have taken this approach. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2017(3) (2012); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2007).
184
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eliminate the nondisclosure problem, it does shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. Finally, to address the problem of nondisclosure, the guidelines
could consider a compromise by allowing a condom defense only when the
HIV-positive individual also disclosed her status.191 Given the importance
of condom use in public health prevention strategies, any of these statutory
approaches to promoting condom use would be a great public health
improvement in HIV-exposure legislation.
2. Protecting Defendants from Unfair Prosecution.—Given the
credibility and evidentiary problems that many HIV-positive defendants
face,192 federal guidelines should encourage procedural requirements that
prevent unfair prosecutions. First, the prosecution should have the burden
of proving actual transmission. Second, because HIV-positive defendants
often face prejudice and discrimination, the burden of proving
nondisclosure and consent should also lie with the prosecution. Because a
similar debate concerning the burden of proof arose when many states were
reforming their rape statutes, related recommendations for rape reform laws
is instructive. Ultimately, federal guidelines should be carefully tailored to
specifically promote public health and prevention goals.
The first evidentiary issue to consider is whether federal guidelines
should recommend adding actual HIV transmission as an element of the
offense. Current HIV-exposure statutes target the mere risk of transmission
as a sufficient harm warranting criminal sanction. In theory, criminalizing
the risk of transmission, rather than actual transmission, may promote
public health goals by incentivizing HIV-positive individuals to exercise
greater caution with sex partners. Empirical studies, however, have raised
doubts about whether these laws actually have the desired deterrent
effect.193 If deterrence is unlikely, the remaining justification for these laws
lies in retribution. Under a retributive approach, however, not requiring
evidence of actual transmission sends a message that having sex with an
HIV-positive individual is itself harmful and further fuels the stigma that is
already attached to having HIV.194 If actual transmission were made an
element of the offense, HIV-positive individuals who acted with the intent
to transmit HIV but fortuitously failed could still be prosecuted under
general criminal statutes, such as for reckless endangerment or assault.
HIV-specific statutes would then be limited to those instances where actual
191

North Dakota has taken this approach. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (“It is an
affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that if the transfer was by sexual activity, the
sexual activity took place between consenting adults after full disclosure of the risk of such activity and
with the use of an appropriate prophylactic device.” (emphasis added)).
192
See supra Part III.B.
193
See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 114, at 505 (finding in an empirical study with a 490-person
sample that “belief that the law requires disclosure or condom use . . . did not predict actual sexual
behavior among either the infected or the uninfected”).
194
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1535–36.
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transmission resulted. This approach would cabin the detrimental,
stigmatizing effects of these statutes only for those cases exhibiting the
highest degree of harm.
If revised federal guidelines took this actual transmission approach,
they could additionally require the prosecution to prove that the victim was
HIV-negative prior to his encounter with the defendant and that it was the
specific defendant’s conduct that resulted in actual transmission to the
victim. The prosecution would have two means of demonstrating
transmission between the defendant and the alleged victim. First, testing is
now available to compare the DNA sequences in HIV strains in two
individuals.195 Alternatively, the prosecution could introduce evidence
related to the victim’s prior HIV status and sexual history. Placing these
evidentiary burdens on the prosecution would help to balance the bias that
many HIV-positive defendants face during HIV-exposure prosecutions,
would encourage more widespread HIV testing, and would promote greater
joint responsibility for choices regarding consensual sex.
Even if federal guidelines did not go so far as requiring actual
transmission, other evidentiary approaches could be used to eliminate
unfair prosecutions. As discussed in Part III.B, states are split on how to
allocate the burden of proving disclosure and consent.196 A similar debate
about where to place the burden of consent developed in the context of
reforming rape laws. Comparing these debates will help demonstrate where
it is most appropriate to place the burden in HIV-exposure prosecutions.
Advocates of reforming rape laws have argued that the defendant
should have the burden of proving consent.197 This shift was an attempt to
move the emphasis away from the rape victim’s behavior and to focus
instead on the defendant’s misconduct.198 Reformers wanted to avoid “an
invitation to put the victim on trial.”199 HIV-exposure laws warrant a
different approach. Placing the burden on the prosecution in an HIVexposure case is appropriate given the different kinds of harm involved in
195

See Michael L. Metzker et al., Molecular Evidence of HIV-1 Transmission in a Criminal Case,
99 PNAS 14,292 (2002). A confirmed relationship between two HIV strains, however, confirms only
the transmission event, not the direction of transmission. See id. at 14,296. The testing also does not
foreclose the possibility that additional individuals were “involved in a series of intermediate
transmissions.” Id. Incubation periods, during which the virus is not detectable, may also make this
element of proof more difficult. See Closen, supra note 29, at 49 (“As a practical matter, due to the
possibly very long incubation period for symptoms of HIV infection, many individuals will not be able
to identify the time, place, and source of their HIV infection—let alone to prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
196
See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
197
See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for
the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 425–28 (1988).
198
See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 22 (1998).
199
Id.
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HIV exposure and rape. Professor Margo Kaplan illustrates these
differences: whereas “[a] defendant is guilty of rape when she engages in
sexual activity without the victim’s consent,” a defendant is guilty of HIV
exposure “when she exposes her partner to a risk of sexual activity.”200
Similar differences appear with respect to the type of consent that the two
crimes require: “The fact finders in a rape case must determine whether the
victim consented to the sexual activity, not whether the victim consented to
the defendant creating a risk of the victim being raped. . . . [O]nly consent
to the sex itself negates the wrongfulness of the [rape] assault.”201 HIVexposure statutes, in contrast, “criminalize the creation of risk. The consent
defense requires a determination of whether an individual consented to
risk . . . .”202
Many HIV-exposure statutes incorrectly make consent contingent on
an HIV-positive individual’s prior disclosure; in other words, if the HIVpositive individual has not disclosed her status, her partner is not able to
consent.203 This approach confuses the harm to which a victim is
consenting. Knowledge of a sexual partner’s HIV status “is neither
necessary nor sufficient for consent to risk of transmission.”204 There is
always a degree of risk, however slight, that a sex partner of unknown
status is HIV positive or has some other STI.205 Even if a partner lies about
her status by claiming to be HIV negative, the victim still assumes a risk of
transmission when he does not insist on using a condom or engaging in
low-risk behavior. Ignoring this assumed risk in the context of consensual
sex potentially creates a perverse incentive for HIV-negative individuals to
avoid taking responsibility for their sexual choices.
In the prosecution context, placing the burden of proving consent
entirely on HIV-positive individuals “obscures the fact that both partners
involved in a [consensual] sexual encounter are responsible for taking
precautions to prevent the transmission of disease” and “masks the
responsibility of uninfected partners to insist on condom use.”206
Furthermore, whereas rape victims have historically faced stigma in the
context of rape prosecutions, HIV-exposure victims do not face the same
stigma. To the contrary, it is HIV-positive defendants that must battle a
history of marginalization and prejudice, thus warranting an approach that
places a greater burden on the prosecution. Therefore, in the context of
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HIV exposure, it is appropriate to place the burden of proving
nondisclosure and consent on the prosecution.
3. Setting Guidelines for Proportionate Punishment.—The federal
guidelines should encourage states to authorize proportionate sentences for
HIV-exposure crimes. The remarkably high sentences available under
current HIV-exposure statutes, even when transmission does not result,
send the message that sex with an HIV-positive individual is per se
harmful.207 This message is inconsistent with advances in disability law,
where the Americans with Disabilities Act has recognized HIV as a
disability in an attempt to eliminate the stigma and discrimination attached
to HIV status.208 Broad HIV-exposure laws thus inappropriately “[p]unish[]
an HIV-positive individual for her partner’s perception of being tainted”
and “use[] the expressive power of the criminal law to promote the
stigmatization of and discrimination against HIV-positive individuals.”209
One approach is to recommend that HIV-exposure sanctions be
comparable to those available under general STI-exposure statutes.210
Whereas most HIV-exposure statutes classify the crime as a felony,211 the
penalties under general STI statutes are generally misdemeanors.212 Indeed,
the advances in HIV treatment supports grouping HIV with other STIs.213
Furthermore, while HIV/AIDS still does kill people, so do other STIs, such
as HPV (the human papillomavirus), which can cause cervical cancer.214
Therefore, setting aside HIV in its own category may no longer be
appropriate.
A second approach would be to recommend different sentencing
ranges depending on the established mental state of the defendant.
Currently, the exclusive focus on knowledge of status results in
unreasonable sentences.215 Instead, a defendant who acted with the intent to
transmit HIV should be subject to a harsher sentence than a defendant who
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acted only recklessly or negligently.216 While the line between intent and
knowledge may seem blurry, taking a graded approach would allow
prosecutors and courts to distinguish between an HIV-positive individual
who repeatedly exposed others to the virus and failed to wear a condom
and another HIV-positive individual who, acting on the advice of her
doctor that her viral load was low, chose to engage in sexual activities, such
as performing oral sex, that have a lower or even negligible risk of
transmission.
Finally, the strictest approach would be to only punish individuals who
act with the intent to transmit.217 But even in states that have required proof
of intent in the language of their statutes, this intent requirement has been
inappropriately interpreted to refer to intent to engage in sexual conduct.218
Instead, the guidelines should require intent to transmit HIV.219 To prove
intent to transmit, the prosecution could rely on circumstantial evidence,
such as whether the defendant disclosed her status or instead lied about
having HIV, failed to use a condom or other protection, or had multiple
charges brought against her, demonstrating a pattern of high-risk
behavior.220 Some might respond that criminalizing only intentional
transmission does not reach broadly enough to sanction HIV-positive
individuals who also pose a public health risk by acting knowingly or
recklessly. By only criminalizing the highest degree of culpability,
however, federal guidelines would place a greater emphasis on joint
responsibility in sexual relationships by encouraging condom use and
would help eliminate the discrimination that HIV-positive individuals face.
4. Providing Adequate Funding.—Finally, in order to encourage
states to follow revised federal guidelines, it is crucial that Congress
condition HIV/AIDS funding on states’ reforming their statutes in
conformance with the guidelines. Without the inducement of federal
funding, new federal guidelines would likely be as ineffective as the
Presidential Commission report in encouraging appropriate criminal laws.
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Indeed, the CARE Act, which made federal HIV/AIDS funding contingent
on states having adequate criminal laws to prosecute exposure,221 played a
large role in the development of HIV-specific statutes. Although only four
states had HIV-specific statutes when the Presidential Commission released
its report, by 1993—three years after the CARE Act was implemented—
nearly half of the states had HIV-specific statutes.222 By providing new
federal funding to implement prevention-oriented HIV-exposure statutes,
revised federal guidelines could change the trajectory of HIV
criminalization.
CONCLUSION
Because HIV is now a chronic condition rather than a death sentence,
it is necessary to face the fact that consensual sex is a normal part of living
a full life, even for individuals living with HIV. The unspoken justification
for maintaining existing HIV-specific statutes is that HIV-positive
individuals have lost their right to have any sexual contact.223 This
unspoken prohibition is a kind of nonphysical exile of HIV-positive
individuals from society.224 And when HIV-positive individuals dare
challenge this exile, the criminal law responds by physically exiling them
to prison, often for unreasonable periods of time. Thus, what is really being
criminalized is having sex while HIV positive. This problem is frequently
ignored, largely because of the tendency to stigmatize people living with
HIV.
By passing the REPEAL Act, Congress could address these problems
and provide updated guidelines for HIV-criminalization statutes.
Guidelines requiring clearly drafted HIV-specific statutes that reflect
scientifically established modes of transmission could better supplement
public health and prevention efforts. Narrowly tailored HIV-specific
statutes could also reduce the risk of unfair and arbitrary prosecutions by
establishing higher burdens of proof for the prosecution. By passing the
REPEAL Act and providing revised federal guidelines, the federal
government would set the standard for national HIV-criminalization reform
and end the senseless marginalization of HIV-positive individuals.
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